Volume 82

Issue 3

Article 6

April 1980

Alas and Alack, Modified Comparative Negligence Comes to West
Virginia
Thomas C. Cady
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas C. Cady, Alas and Alack, Modified Comparative Negligence Comes to West Virginia, 82 W. Va. L.
Rev. (1980).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss3/6

This Symposium on Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co. - West Virginia Adopts Comparative Negligence is brought to
you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted
for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more
information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Cady: Alas and Alack, Modified Comparative Negligence Comes to West Vir

SYMPOSIUM ON BRADLEY V.
APPALACHIAN POWER CO. - WEST
VIRGINIA ADOPTS COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE
ARTICLES

Alas and Alack, Modified Comparative Negligence
Comes to West Virginia .............. Thomas C. Cady

473

Comparative Negligence in West Virginia:
A Defense Overview .................... Alvin L. Emch

493

The Plaintiff's View of Comparative
Negligence ....................... E. Joseph Buffa, Jr. 523
Negotiation and Settlement: An Insurer's View
of Comparative Negligence .............. John L. Hunt

537

Appendix-Sample Special Interrogatory Forms .........

545

Alas and Alack, Modified Comparative
Negligence Comes to West Virginia
THOMAS C. CADY*
INTRODUCTION

On July 10, 1979, the West Virginia court issued its now famous Bradley1 decision rejecting contributory negligence and
adopting comparative negligence. The court's decision reminds
me of a scene from "On the Waterfront" where Marion Brando,
as a punch drunk, has-been fighter, tells his brother, "Ya know, I
could have been really something, I could have been champion. I
could have been really great." I also am reminded of the southern
hustler who ran a fleece called "Dare to be Great." Well, the court
dared to be great and it could have been really great, but like
* B.A., Rice University, 1958; L.L.B., University of Texas, 1965; L.L.M., Georgetown University, 1967; Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
Ellen S. Cappellanti, West Virginia College of Law, Class of 1980, assisted me
with this article. It's more hers than mine. Thanks, Ellen.
I Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979). Bradley
consists of two cases consolidated for appeal: Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.,
Appeal No. 14310 (wrongful death action); Napier v. Elk Grocery, Appeal No.
14345 (personal injury suit).
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Marlon Brando and the southern hustler, the court ends up, shall
we say, not a champion, not so great but a runner-up, almost a
half a century behind.
Contributory negligence entered the English common law in
the infamous Butterfield v. Forrester,2 where the plaintiff, who
was riding his horse as fast as it could go, did not observe a pole
that the defendant negligently had placed across the highway.
The plaintiff ran into it, was severely hurt, and sued the defendant. The trial court charged the jurors that if they determined
the plaintiff had not used due care, they should find for the defendant. The plaintiff's attorney objected on the grounds that the
clear precedent was to leave to the jury the question of whether
to allow the plaintiff to recover all or nothing.3 On appeal, Lord
Ellenborough (who had proved only one year prior that his forte
was not common sense when he decided that there was no such
thing as a wrongful death action at common law4 ) created the
contributory negligence doctrine. He stated as justification, "[a]
party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction." 5 Moreover,
Judge Bayley thought the accident "appeared to happen entirely
from his [the plaintiff's] own fault."'
Those statements are not the language of contributory negligence but are the words of assumption of risk. While Butterfield
certainly could have been so read, such was not to be. Instead,
Butterfield became the source of the broad rule of common law
contributory negligence: the plaintiff's negligence, however slight,
proximately contributing to the accident, is a complete bar to any
recovery. Theoretically in a tort system based on fault, it is clear
that the plaintiff's fault should affect his recovery. There is no
logic, however, in the rule that plaintiff's fault should completely
bar any recovery.
Despite its illogic, the stern, all or nothing rule of contributory negligence proved to be a favorite of the morally staunch
nineteenth century judiciary. It swept the common law world,
making its first appearance in the United States via an 1825 Mas11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
For cases reflecting this precedent see Cruden v. Fentham, 2 Esp. 685, 170
Eng. Rep. 496 (1799); Clay v. Wood, 5 Esp. 44, 170 Eng. Rep. 732 (1803).
4 Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
11 East at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
Id.
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sachusetts case,7 factually similar to Butterfield, and in West Virginia in an 1877 case.8 Indeed, a Pennsylvania jurist in 1854 remarked that the contributory negligence doctrine was a "rule
from time immemorial" and that it was "not likely to be changed
in all time to come."" The jurist was wrong in two respects: his
knowledge of history was too shallow as the rule was created in
1809, hardly "time immemorial" by 1854, and his predictive ability was too short as the rule was soon to be changed in Illinois in
185810 and in Kansas in 1887.11

The popularity of the doctrine was manifested by a judicial
readiness to rule as a matter of law that the plaintiff had been
contributorily negligent. Perhaps a high water mark of such judicial behavior is the West Virginia case of Mathews v. Cumberland
& Allegheny Gas Company.12 There, the plaintiff was an innocent
bystander who was watching the defendant's workmen purge a
gas line with a pressure hose. The hose came loose and whirled
about in the air. The plaintiff and the other bystanders scattered
for their safety but the plaintiff was struck by a passing auto. On
these facts, Judge Haymond ruled not only that the defendant
was not negligent and that defendant's non-negligence was not a
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, 13 but that the plaintiff's
contributory negligence was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's
14
injuries.

Strangely enough, while the doctrine was a judicial favorite,
it was also a judicial disfavorite. In short, the courts became
schizoid about its harshness and how strictly it was applied. As
soon as the doctrine was adopted, courts began to formulate
counter-doctrines to mitigate the rule's harshness. Some of the
standard counter-doctrines include:
(1) Contributory negligence is not a defense when defendant's conduct is intentional, 5 or wilfull, wanton, and reckless. 16
Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824).
8Snyder v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry., 11 W. Va. 14 (1877).
'

Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147, 149 (1854).
10Galena

& C. Union R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 IIl. 478 (1858).
11Wichita & W.R.R. v. Davis, 37 Kan. 743, 16 P. 78 (1887).
22 138 W. Va. 639, 77 S.E.2d 180 (1953).
IsId. at 651, 77 S.E.2d at 187.
14

Id. at 655, 77 S.E.2d at 189.

"8Stone v. Rudolph, 127 W. Va. 335, 32 S.E.2d 742 (1944);
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(2) Contributory negligence is not a defense when the defendant violates a statute which is designed to protect the plaintiff
from the risk encountered 17 (e.g., a child injured by a weapon sold
by the defendant to the plaintiff in violation of the gun control
laws).
(3) Contributory negligence is defeated when the defendant
has the last clear chance to avoid injury to the plaintiff.1 " This is
the familiar jackass doctrine from Davies v. Mann 9 (1842), decided very soon after Butterfield (1809).
(4) Contributory negligence is neither a21defense in strict liability cases 20 nor in products liability cases.
(5) Contributory negligence is distinctly a jury issue so that
the jury can apply its own rough and illegal standard of comparative negligence. 22 Indeed, West Virginia became a de facto comparative negligence jurisdiction in 1977 with Freshwater v.
Booth,2 3 where the West Virginia court expressly approved compromise verdicts, noting:
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 481 (1965).
.. Stone v. Rudolph, 127 W. Va. 335, 32 S.E.2d 742 (1944); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 482 (1965). Section 482(2) states an exception to this general

rule: "A plaintiff whose conduct is in reckless disregard of his own safety is barred
from recovery against a defendant whose reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety
is a legal cause of the plaintiff's harm."
17 Pitzer v. M.D. Tomkies & Sons, 136 W. Va. 268, 67 S.E.2d 437 (1951). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 483 provides that "[t]he plaintiff's contributory

negligence bars his recovery for the negligence of the defendant consisting of the
violation of a statute, unless the effect of the statute is to place the entire responsibility for such harm as has occured upon the defendant."
'8 Barr v. Curry, 137 W. Va. 364, 71 S.E.2d 313 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 480 (1965). According to § 480 this doctrine will defeat the defense of contributory negligence only when the defendant knows of the plaintiff's
situation, realizes that the plaintiff will be unable to discover his peril in time to
avoid injury, and is negligent in using the existing opportunity to avoid the harm.
" 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842).
20 Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), aftig L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866);
Weaver Merchantile Co. v. Thurmond, 68 W. Va. 530, 70 S.E. 126 (1911); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 (1965).
21 Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965).
22 V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 7 (1974). Deference

to the findings

of the jury in such cases is illustrated by Bourne v. Mooney, 254 S.E.2d 819 (W.
Va. 1979).
23 233 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1977).
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it has long been accepted in practice if not in the theory of
jury instructions, that the jury takes into consideration relative
degrees of fault in awarding compensation. If we really wished
to have juries decide the question of damages without regard
to gradations of fault, then we would bifurcate24 the trial process
and have separate juries pass on each issue.
(6) Courts routinely held the plaintiff to an easier standard of
due care in evaluating his negligent conduct compared to the
standard of due care used in judging the defendant's negligent26
conduct. 25 Typical is the West Virginia case of Wager v. Sine
where the lower court ruled as a matter of law that plaintiff was
not negligent but left the task of evaluating the defendant's conduct to the jury although the conduct of both parties was remarkably similar.
(7) Contributory negligence is either not a defense or a diffi27
cult defense to raise when the plaintiff is a child. For example,
in West Virginia there is a rebuttable presumption that a child
and fourteen is incapable of being conbetween the ages of seven
28
negligent.
tributorily
These mitigating rules adopted by the courts, including the
West Virginia court, eroded the concept of contributory negligence as a complete all or nothing defense and produced comparative negligence reform.
As of today comparative negligence is by far the majority rule
in the United States. Only fourteen states still cling to the old
common law rule of contributory negligence.2 9 Thirty-five American jurisdictions have adopted comparative negligence by legislation 0 and five states have adopted comparative negligence by
Id. at 317.
See James, Contributory Negligence, 62 Yale L.J. 691 (1953).
'5 201 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1973).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A, comments a and b (1965); Jordan
v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 625 (W. Va. 1974).
2* Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 625 (W. Va. 1974).
" These states are: Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennes24
25

see and Virginia. The District of Columbia also has contributory negligence.
'0 See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979); C.Z. CODE tit. 4, § 1357
(1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h
(West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1968 Revisions); GUAN. Civ. CODE §
1714 (1979); HAW. REv. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (1979); KAN.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 6

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

court decision.31 Further, the United States Supreme Court, re-

jecting 120 years of precedent in 1975, adopted comparative negligence in admiralty cases.3 2 In civil law countries, comparative
negligence is and has been the almost universal rule.3 England
dumped Butterfield in 1945 s" and most of the rest of the common
law world has also adopted comparative negligence.3 5
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MODELS

Before discussing the Bradley decision, it is helpful to ex-

amine the different forms of comparative negligence from which
the West Virginia court could have chosen. Although the specific
language and impact of comparative negligence laws vary from
state to state, there are only two general models of comparative
negligence: modified comparative negligence and pure comparative negligence.
§ 60-258a (1976); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp. 1980); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (Michie/Law
Co-op Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 58.607.1 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-1151 (1975 reissue); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507:7a (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-19-07 (1975); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1977); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2101 (Purdon Supp. 1979); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141
(1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1979); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2
(1979 revision); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1980);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1451 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1978);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1979); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977).
Ohio recently enacted a comparative negligence statute which will become effective June 20, 1980. This statute will be codified at OHio REV. CODE ANN. §
2315.19.
31 Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1978); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.
3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431
(Fla. 1973); Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977); Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
:2 United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
33 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 435 (4th ed. 1971).
. SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 4 n.42.
35 PROSSER, supra note 33, at 436 nn.80 & 81; SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 4;
Wade, A Uniform ComparativeFault Act-What Should It Provide?, 10 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 220, 224 (1977).
STAT. ANN.
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Modified Comparative Negligence
Slight-Gross. The plaintiff may recover if his negligence is
slight and the defendant's negligence is gross. The plaintiff's
damages are reduced by the percentage of fault attributed to the
plaintiff and the defendant cannot recover. This form exists in
only two states, Nebraska s and South Dakota,3 7 and has been
dismissed by Dean Wade as having no current support. 8
Not as great as or the 49%/51% form. The plaintiff
may recover if his negligence is not as great as the defendant's.
The plaintiff's damages are reduced by the percentage of his
fault, and the defendant cannot recover. When the negligence of
both parties is equal, neither may recover. This form was introduced by Wisconsin in 1931 and was once the most popular form,
but is now in effect in only eleven jurisdictions.3 9
Not greater than or the 50% form. The plaintiff may
recover if his negligence is not greater than the defendant's. The
plaintiff's damages are reduced by the percentage of his fault, and
the defendant cannot recover. When the parties are equally negligent, each party may recover 50% of his damages. If each
party's negligence is adjusted by one percentage point so that the
plaintiff is 49% negligent and the defendant is 51 %7negligent,the
plaintiff gets 51% of his damages but the defendant gets no damis the most popular as it is in effect in
ages at all. This form
40
fifteen jurisdictions.
36 NEB. REV. STAT.
37

S.D. Come. LAws

§ 25-1151 (1975 reissue).
ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979 revision).

38 Wade, supra note 35, at 224.

39 See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973); GA.
CODE § 105-603 (1968 revisions); GuAm Civ. CODE § 1714 (1979); IDAHO CODE § 6801 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156
(1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977);
Wvo. STAT. 1-1-109 (1977).

Ohio recently enacted this type of statute which will become effective on June
20, 1980. This statute will be codified at OHIO RaV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19.
40 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1979); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 663-31 (1976); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1979);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1979); MONT. RaV. CODES ANN. § 58:607.1
(Supp. 1977); NEV. Rav. STAT. § 41.141 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7a
(Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.1 (West Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 13 (West Supp. 1979); OR. Rav. STAT. § 18.470 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
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Pure Comparative Negligence
Each party may recover his damages reduced by the percentage of his fault. Pure comparative negligence has been adopted in
eleven jurisdictions.4 1 While the pure form is not the form used in
the majority of comparative negligence jurisdictions, it has been
adopted in the two most populous states, and it is the form utilized in England, most states in Australia, most provinces in Ca2
nada, and in most other common law and civil law countries.4 It
served as the beginning model for the Uniform Comparative
4
Fault Act. '

It is especially noteworthy that in those jurisdictions adopting comparative negligence by statute, the legislatures, tainted by
political realities, have almost invariably selected the modified
forms, 44 while in those jurisdictions adopting comparative negli17, § 2101 (Purdon Supp. 1979); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 1 (Vernon
Supp. 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1451
(Cum. Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1979).
"I See: Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13
Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.
2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977); C.Z.
CODE tit. 4, §1357 (1979); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp. 1980); MIss.
CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); P.R.
LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1979); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1978).
The United States Supreme Court also adopted the pure form of comparative
negligence for apportioning property damages in admiralty suits. United States v.
Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 387 (1975).
42 Wade, supra note 35, at 225; SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 49 & n.31.
43 The Uniform Comparative Fault Act was prepared by a special committee
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
presented at the national conference's 1977 annual meeting. Torts covered by the
act are actions "for injury to person or property based on negligence [of any kind),
recklessness [wanton misconduct], strict liability or breach of warranty or a tort
action based on a statute unless otherwise indicated by the statute ....
"UNIFORM ComPARATIvE FAULT ACT § 1, reprinted in Wade, supra note 35, at 226.
" Of the 35 American jurisdictions which have adopted comparative negligence by statute, supranote 30, all but seven (Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi,
New York, Rhode Island, Washington and Puerto Rico) have chosen modified
forms.
In those states adopting comparative negligence by statute, it has been suggested that the statutes "were hastily and inartistically drafted. Determinations
were sometimes made as a result of the influence of special interest pressure
groups [target defendants and their insurers], and these conflicting pressures often
produced undesirable compromises." Wade, supra note 35, at 221-22.
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gence by judicial decision, the judges, in the quiet reflection of
judicial chambers, have chosen the pure form.45 Nevertheless, in
1979, despite the reasoned decisions by the courts in Alaska, California, Florida, and Michigan and the United States Supreme
Court and despite the academic wisdom of Dean Keeton, 4' Dean
Prosser,'4 7 Professor Wade, 48 Professor Keeton"9 and Professor
Schwartz, 50 among others,5 1 the West Virginia court in Bradley
adopted modified (not-as-great-as) form. The modified form is a
remnant of the thirties5 2 while the pure form is the brain-child of
the seventies. 53 Why would the court reject the freshness of
youthful wisdom for the staleness of antiquated doctrine? According to Justice Miller: "we are not willing to abandon the concept that where a party substantially contributes to his own damages, he should not be permitted to recover for any part of
them."

54

45 See note 31 supra. Of the six jurisdictions which have adopted comparative
negligence judicially, all but West Virginia (in Bradley) chose the pure form.
46 See Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 9 (1974).
47 See Prosser, ComparativeNegligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465 (1953).
48 See Wade, supra note 34.
49See Keeton, Comparativev. ContributoryNegligence: Should the Court or
Legislature Decide, Comments on Maki v. Frelk, 21 VARD. L. Rav. 899, 916
(1968).
50 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 342.
" See GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
(1936); Campbell, Recent Developments of the Law of Negligence in Wisconsin Part II, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 4; Davis, Comparative Negligence, Comparative Contribution,and Equal Protectionin the Trial and Settlement of Multiple Defendant Product Cases, 10 Ibm. L. REV. 831 (1977); Gregory, Loss Distribution by
ComparativeNegligence, 21 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1936); Juenger, Brief for Negligence
Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan in Support of ComparativeNegligence
as Amicus Curiae,Parsonsonv. ConstructionEquipment Co., 18 WAYNE L. REV. 3
(1972).
:2Although the modified forms can be traced to three Georgia cases decided
more than 100 years ago (Macon & W.R. Co. v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250, 254 (1858);
Macon & W.R. Co. v. Davis, 27 Ga. 113, 119 (1859); Flanders v. Meath, 27 Ga. 358,
362 (1859)), the Wisconsin modified comparative negligence statute, WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 895.045 (1931) (amended 1971), adopted in 1931, became the universal
model for many other states. SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 75. This statute originally provided that the plaintiff could not recover if his negligence was equal to or
greater than that of the defendant. However, this was amended in 1971 to permit
recovery by the 50% negligent plaintiff. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp.
1979).
53 See notes 41 and 43 supra.
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W. Va. 1979).
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In other words, the West Virginia court believes that in a faultbased system of liability it is immoral (akin to no-fault) to allow a
fault-ridden party who is more at fault or equally at fault to recover anything from a party less at fault or equally at fault. Rubbish. The court misses the fundamental premise of a fault-based
system of liability.
That premise is to search for a party at fault and to shift the
loss from the victim to the wrongdoer by requiring the wrongdoer
to repair the loss in the form of money damages. The error of the
contributory negligence doctrine is its all-or-nothing harshness.
The doctrine penalizes and rewards the parties: no one recovers
and no one pays. The error of the modified forms of comparative
negligence is that they only soften the old harshness; one recovers
something but pays nothing. Moreover, the modified forms, depending on the percentage of fault, result in erratic allocations of
damages. 5 Only the pure form allocates damages to all parties
as SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 347. Wade, supra note 35, at 224-25, points
out that the extreme distortion with modified forms arises when there are multiple plaintiffs and cross claims:
To compare the two forms [modified and pure], take variations of a
case in which A and B were both negligent and both injured. Assume A's
negligence is found to be 25% and B's is found to be 75%.
Case (1). Assume each party suffers $8,000 damages. Under the
modified form, A recovers $6,000; B recovers nothing. A's loss is $2,000
(all his own), or 12.5% of the total of $16,000. B's loss is $14,000 ($6,000
to A, and $8,000 of his own) for 87.5% of the total. Under the pure form
(assuming no set-off), A recovers $6,000: B, $2,000. A's loss is $4,000
($2,000 to B and $2,000 of his own) for 25% of the total; B's loss is
$12,000 ($6,000 to A and $6,000 of his own) for 75% of the total.
Case (2). Assume A suffers $4,000 damages; B, $12,000. Under the
modified form, A recovers $3,000; B, nothing. A incurs $1,000 (all his
own) for 6% of the total; B incurs $15,000 ($3,000 to A and $12,000 of
his own) for 94% of the total. Under the pure form, A recovers $3,000;
B, $3,000. A incurs $4,000 loss ($3,000 to B and $1,000 of his own) for
25% of the total; B incurs $12,000 ($3,000 to A and $12,000 of his own)
for 75% of the total.
Case (3). Assume A suffers $12,000 damages; B, $4,000. Under the
modified form, A recovers $9,000; B, nothing. A incurs $3,000 loss (all
his own) for 19% of the total; B incurs $13,000 loss ($9,000 to A, $4,000
of his own) for 81% of the total. Under the pure form, A recovers
$9,000; B, $1,000. A incurs $4,000 loss ($1,000 to B and $3,000 of his
own) for 25% of the total; B incurs $12,000 loss ($9,000 to A and $3,000
of his own) for 75%.
Case (4). Now change the fault percentage. Assume that each party
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with complete justice: all parties recover and pay according to
their respective faults. The court, however, felt that the "pure
comparative negligence rule and its resulting singular emphasis
on the amount of damages and insurance coverage as the ultimate
touchstone of the viability of instituting a suit" 56 was basically
inequitable. Again rubbish. The focus of tort law is two fold: fault
and damages. The pure comparative negligence rule does not singularly emphasize damages: it synthesizes fault and damages by
sorting out fault and assigning damages collectible for that degree
of fault. The error of the court is its simple minded emphasis on
negligence - only one half of the premise of a fault-based system. The court's resolution in adopting the 49%/51% rule is only
partial "complete justice."
The court's reluctance to abandon what it conceives to be the
concept of a fault-based system is reinforced by the typical dogin-the-manger hypothetical. It states:
[A] plaintiff who has sustained a moderate injury with a potential jury verdict of $20,000, and who is 90 percent fault-free,
may be reluctant to file suit against a defendant who is 90 percent at fault, but who has received severe injuries and whose
case carries a potential of $800,000 in damages from a jury verdict. In this situation, even though the defendant's verdict is
reduced by his 90 percent fault to $80,000, it is still far in excess of the plaintiff's potential recovery of $18,000.57
One wonders where the court found such an extreme illustration.
However, one need look no further than Professor Schwartz's authoritative text on comparative negligence where he presents a
similar example.5 8 Professor Schwartz destroys this type of hypothetical as unusual, unrealistic, and unfair.5 9 Furthermore, the
suffered $8,000 damages and that A was 49% negligent; B, 51%. Under
the modified form, A recovers $4,080; B, nothing. A incurs $3,920 loss
(all his own) for 24.5% of the total; B incurs $12,080 loss ($4,080 to A
and $8,000 of his own) for 74.5% of the total. Under the pure form, A
incurs $7,840 loss ($3,920 to B and $3,920 of his own) for 49% of the

total; B incurs $8,160 loss ($4,080 to A, and $4,080 of his own) for 51%
of the total.
256 S.E.2d at 885.
Id. at 888 (footnote omitted).
SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 344-45.
Schwartz's hypothetical consists of a 90% negligent plaintiff who suffered
$100,000 in dgmages and recovered $10,000 from a 10% negligent defendant. The
defendant suffered $1,000 in damages. After a set-off, the defendant had to pay
"

'1
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court's resolution of its own hypothetical is incomplete. Let us
complete the resolution of the hypothetical by applying the
court's own rule and then comparing that result with the outcome
under the pure comparative negligence rule.
Table I will simplify the task. The two rules are compared
above and below each other. Notice particularly that under the
court's rule the 10% negligent plaintiff bears only .24% of the
total cost of the accident while the 90% negligent defendant
bears a whopping 110.8% of the total cost of the accident. Thus,
under the court's rule the plaintiff is rewarded in excess of his
culpability and the defendant is punished in excess of his culpability. However, under the pure comparative negligence rule,
damages received and paid are consistently proportionate to the
party's percentage of fault.
The court later notes: "The courts which have adopted the
pure comparative negligence rule have not discussed this type of
result [referring to the result of a recovery of $18,000 but payment of $80,000]. '"60 Of course the courts have not discussed the
the plaintiff $9,100.
He rebuts this example by stating:
On the surface, the result of the hypothetical case seems hard to
justify. Nevertheless, there is a convincing answer in justification. First,
making a judgment about an entire comparative negligence system
based on an unusual hypothetical case is a classic example of a hard case
making bad law. Mississippi has had pure comparative negligence since
1910 in all personal injury actions; yet a search of the pages of annotations to that statute will not reveal any cases in which a 90% at fault
plaintiff obtained a substantial recovery from a defendant.
Even judging the hypothetical case as if it were likely to occur, the
fault of the plaintiff has not been ignored. He has been made to bear
90% of his costs and 90% of the defendant's costs from an accident for
which he was 90% at fault. Why should he bear 100% of all costs? Or
even all of his own costs plus 90% of defendant's? This would tax him
beyond his culpability.
Finally, any surface unfairness of pure comparative negligence is reduced by the fact that proximate cause rules may bar the claims of
plaintiffs when their negligence was the substantial cause of the
accident.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 344-45 (footnotes omitted.).
10 256 S.E.2d at 883 n.11.
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result for the reasons given by Professor Schwartz.6 1 Bradley also
states that the pure comparative negligence courts "appear to
proceed on the unstated assumption that all accidents will be covered by sufficient insurance to pay all the verdicts stemming from
a multi-party accident. '6 2 The court's concern is unpersuasive because the problem of sufficient insurance to pay off any verdict
arising from a single or multi-party accident exists in any system
of fault-based liability, contributory, modified or pure.
The court then goes on to hypothecate further by adding an
insurance resolution to its previous example:
If we consider the text illustration and assume the plaintiff has
a modest insurance limit of $50,000 for any one injury, the potential exposure to an $80,000 net verdict in favor of the 90percent-at-fault, but seriously damaged defendant, creates a
substantial practical bar to a suit. It is doubtful that a competent attorney would advise the plaintiff to sue, since the plaintiff s claim has a maximum jury potential of $20,000, which
nets $18,000 when reduced by his 10 percent fault or contributory negligence. This leaves the plaintiff with a potential
$12,000 uninsured exposure even after he recovers his $18,000
and pays it to the defendant along with his $50,000 worth of
insurance to satisfy the defendant's $80,000 net verdict.6 3
The short answer to this problem is that while the plaintiff's attorney may advise his client not to sue, the defendant's attorney
will race to the courthouse to get an $80,000 net verdict, $50,000
from the plaintiff's insurance and $30,000 from the plaintiff's assets at a cost to defendant of only $18,000. Of course under the
court's rule, the defendant is absolutely precluded from any recovery of the $80,000 damages caused by the plaintiff, in essence,
resurrecting the harsh all-or-nothing aspect of the abandoned
contributory negligence rule.
THE WEST VIRGINIA RULE

Despite the unfairness of the "not as great as" rule, West
Virginia attorneys are stuck with it, pending legislative reform.
Until the legislature acts (which is highly unlikely), or the court
61 See note 59 supra.

6 256 S.E.2d at 883 n.11.
Id. at 883-884 n.11.
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does an'about face and adopts the pure form (which is equally

unlikely), attorneys will have to cope with an inadequate rule.
The rule, as enunciated in Bradley, is:
(1) A party may recover even though his negligence proximately contributed to his injury so long as his negligence does not
equal or exceed the combined negligence of the other parties involved in the accident."
(2) The proximate cause requirements are not altered by
the new rule; fault is not assessed unless it is the proximate cause
of the opposing party's injuries.6 5
(3) The jury is to return a general verdict specifying each
party's damages and a special interrogatory stating the percentage of fault attributed to each party.66 The judge will calculite
the net amount by reducing each party's gross award by the per67
centage of fault assessed by the jury to each party.

6, Id. at 885. It is difficult to determine what the court means by "other parties to the accident" as this phrase is capable of two constructions: either all
tortfeasors both present and absent, or those tortfeasors actually joined. See
Buffa, The Plaintiff's View of ComparativeNegligence, Symposium on Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co.-West Virginia Adopts Comparative Negligence, 82 W.
VA. L. REV. 523, 528-29 (1980); Emch, ComparativeNegligence in West Virginia:
A Defense Overview, Symposium on Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.-West
Virginia Adopts ComparativeNegligence, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 493, 496 (1980).
65 256 S.E.2d at 885. An argument can be made that although there will be no
theoretical change in proximate cause requirements, there may be a change reflected in the application of this doctrine:
It has been suggested that the harshness of the common law contributory negligence doctrine has at times led courts to allow recovery even when it is found that the claimant failed to exercise reasonable
care for his own safety - by concluding that his contributory negligence
was not a 'proximate cause' of his injury. The subject of proximate cause
is one of the most murky in the law of negligence. It is difficult to determine where, in the law of any particular jurisdiction, 'cause in fact'
leaves off and 'legal cause' takes over. However, to the extent that Ilegal
cause involved consideration of public policy, it is not incredible that
cases employing the proximate cause rationale to ameliorate the harshness of the common law contributory negligence rule might exist. It appears clear that comparative negligence should alleviate the necessity to
resort to such a device.
DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CoMPARATvE NEGLIGENCE PRIMR

13 (1975) (foot-

notes omitted).
68 256 S.E.2d at 885-86.
67 Id. at 386. See Sample Special InterrogatoryForms, Symposium on Brad-
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(4) In regard to joint and several liability, the plaintiff can
still opt to sue only one of several joint tortfeasors68 In turn, the
sued joint tortfeasors may implead other third-party defendants. 9 The plaintiff may elect to collect his joint judgment from
only70 one or any number of the joint tortfeasors sued by the plaintiff.

Joint tortfeasors can apportion damage payments on the

basis of their number without regard to their percentage of fault"1
settlements made by
and can still obtain pro tanto credit from
72
tortfeasors.
joint
other
with
plaintiff
the
(5) The doctrine of last clear chance is still available to the
plaintiff.7 3 However, the court does not give any indication of
leyv. AppalachianPower Co. - West Virginia Adopts ComparativeNegligence,
82 W. VA. L. REv. 545, 548 (1980).
The court does not state whether the jury will be told that if the plaintiff's
negligence is equal to or greater than the defendant's, the plaintiff will not be
permitted to recover. For a discussion of this problem, see Sample Interrogatory
Forms, supra, at 548 n.5.
'I 256 S.E.2d at 886.
69 Id. See Emch, supra note 64, at 501-07, for a discussion of factors that
should be evaluated by the defendant's attorney in making the decision to implead other tortfeasors.
70

256 S.E.2d at 886.

Id. Some commentators suggest, however, that the more equitable approach is comparative contribution. Under this principle, each tortfeasor contributes payment in proportion to his or her fault. See SCHWARTz, supra note 22, at
260-71; Emch, supra note 64 at 497; UNIFORM CoPATrivE FAULT ACT § 2, reprinted in Wade, supra note 35 at 228.
72 256 S.E.2d at 886-87. It is suggested, however, thata pro tanto decrease in the final judgment is an insufficient device to
protect either the settling joint tortfeasor from a later action for contribution, or the non-settling tortfeasor from the possibility of having to
pay more of the total judgment than would be his share under the principles of contribution.
Emch, supra note 64, at 514.
Id. at 887. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. As this doctrine was
developed by the courts to mitigate the harshness of the contributory negligence
rule, the necessity for this rule disappears when comparative negligence is
adopted. W. PRosER, LAW OF TORTS 439 (4th ed. 1971).
By retaining the doctrine of last clear chance, the courts are effectively
by-passing the comparative negligence law and unjustly burdening the
defendant by allowing a plaintiff, who has in fact been contributorily
negligent, to have full recovery. The result is, in effect, the harshness of
the old contributory negligence doctrine in reverse.
Note, Torts: Comparative Negligence and the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Are They Compatible?, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 444, 450 (1975).
71

73
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whether assumption of the risk will remain an absolute defense.-"
(6) As contributory negligence was never a defense to an intentional tort, the court reasons that comparative negligence
"would not come into play" to diminish the damages of a plaintiff
who has been intentionally harmed.7 5 Thus, the comparative negligence doctrine should not apply to other actions where contributory negligence is not a bar to the plaintiff's claim such as workmen's compensation excess suits,7 6 penal suits against employers

who are not subscribers in good standing with the Workmen's
Compensation78Fund,7 and suits where the defendant is subject to
strict liability.

74

Although there are many ways to sub-categorize assumption of risk caaes,

they typically fall into two main categories. One is express assumption of the risk
in which the plaintiff agrees in fact that he will not hold the defendant liable for
potential harm resulting from the defendant's conduct; the other is implied assumption of risk wherein plaintiff's consent to assume the risk and to bear the risk
of harm is implied from the plaintiff's conduct in light of his knowledge of the
circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496 B, C (1965).
Express assumption of the risk should remain a complete defense. However,
the plaintiff's implied assumption of the risk should be merged into the comparative negligence system as conduct to be considered by the fact-finder when apportioning fault. For a very thorough discussion of this doctrine and how other comparative negligence jurisdictions have incorporated it into their apportionment
schemes, see Shaw, The Role of Assumption of Risk in Systems of Comparative
Negligence, 46 INS. COUNSEL J. 361 (1979).
75 256 S.E.2d at 887.
76 W. VA. CODE 23-4-2 (1976 Replacement Vol.) provides in part:
If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate intention
of his employer to produce such injury or death, the employee, the
widow, widower, child or dependent of the employee shall have the privilege to take under this chapter, and shall also have cause of action
against the employer, as if this chapter had not been enacted, for any
excess of damages over the amount received or receivable under this
chapter.
The West Virginia court in Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries Inc., 246 S.E.2d
907 (W. Va. 1979) construed the phrase "deliberate intention" to include, for the
purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act, wilful, wanton or reckless misconduct. Contributory negligence was not a bar to either intentional or wilful, wanton
or reckless conduct. See notes 15, 16 and accompanying text.
7 Penal suits are authorized by W. VA. CODE § 23-2-8 (1978 Replacement
Vol.). The statute provides that the defendant "shall not avail himself of the following common law defenses: The defense of the fellow-servant rule; the defense
of the assumption of risk; or the defense of contributory negligence. . . "
7' See notes 20 and 21 supra. The application of comparative negligence to
tort product liability situations appears to depend on the court's future treatment
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(7) The court concludes that "the new rule of comparative
negligence is fully retroactive,"79 yet fails to state expressly what
is meant by "fully retroactive." By implication, however, it appears that the court adopted the definition of full retroactivity
used by the Michigan court in Placek v. City of Sterling
Heights.s0 Applying the Michigan rule to the Bradley decision,
the rule is retroactive in the following circumstances:
(a) Those cases in which trial commences after July 10, 1979,
including those in which a retrial is to occur because of remand on any other issues;
(b) Those cases pending on appeal before and after July 10,
1979, at which counsel made a request for comparative negligence instructions at the trial level and preserved the issue for
appeal; and
(c) Any case commenced but not submitted to the trier of
fact prior to July 10, 1979, but only if there is a request for
comparative negligence instructions by counsel prior to submission to the trier of fact.
CONCLUSION

Three months before the Bradley decision the West Virginia
court rent asunder the common law of products liability law in

1
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co. s-finding

truth, beauty, and light in strict liability (no-fault) for manufac-

of assumption of risk. In Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666
(W. Va. 1979), the court stated that "contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not
a defense when such negligence consists merely of a failure to discover the defect
in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence." Id. at 666
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n). However, the
court also stated that "the defense of assumption of risk is available against the
plaintiff, where it is shown with full appreciation of the defective condition he
continues to use the product." Id. at 683-84. Thus, if West Virginia incorporates
assumption of risk into the comparative negligence scheme of apportionment, the
next logical step is to apply comparative fault to tort products liability actions.
Furthermore, as Morningstar adopted the rule expressed by the California
Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), the West Virginia court may also follow the California
court's decision in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978), where it was held that comparative fault would apply in
all future strict tort products liability cases.
79 256 S.E.2d at 890.
80405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511, 521-22 (1979), cited in 256 S.E.2d 889 n.23.
81253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
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turers' duty to consumers. Yet the court refused to continue this
progressive trend in Bradley as evinced by its rejection of pure
comparative negligence since "the eye of the needle is no fault
and we are asked not to think about the larger aspect-the camel
representing fault."82 Perhaps 49% of the camel is better than no
camel at all. However, the fact remains that the court has left us
with an inadequate rule which misrepresents the whole concept of
liability based on fault.

82 256 S.E.2d at 883.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 6

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss3/6

20

